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Abstract
We provide theory and evidence to complement Choi’s [RFS, 2013] important new
insights on the returns to equity in ‘value’ firms. We show that higher future earnings
growth ameliorates the value-reducing effect of leverage and, because the market for
earnings is incomplete, reduces the earnings-risk sensitivity of the default option.
Ceteris paribus, a levered firm with low (high) earnings growth is more sensitive to
the first (second) of these effects thus generating higher (lower) expected returns. We
demonstrate this by modelling equity as an Asian-style call option on net earnings
and find significant empirical support for our hypotheses.
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1 Introduction
The positive return premium delivered by firms with low growth opportunities
relative to firms with high growth opportunities is well established empirically (Fama
and French, 1992, 1993; Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein, 1985; Stattman, 1980), but
its fundamental economic drivers remain incompletely understood. Some authors
suggest a rational, risk-based explanations for this premium (Aretz, Bartram, and
Pope, 2010; Fama and French, 1996; Garcia-Feijoo and Jorgensen, 2010; Vassalou,
2003). An alternative stream of research suggests that the value premium reflects
mispricing based on cognitive biases (Daniel and Titman, 1997; Lakonishok, Shleifer,
and Vishny, 1994). A more recent stream of research finds that leverage plays a con-
siderable role in either a firm-level or portfolio-level ‘value’ premium (Choi, 2013;
Garcia-Feijoo and Jorgensen, 2010; Garlappi and Yan, 2011; Gomes and Schmid,
2010; Obreja, 2013) as does asset growth (Cooper, Gulen, and Schill, 2008). More
recently, Choi (2013) provides empirical evidence that the interaction between as-
set risk and financial leverage explains a significant proportion of the equity risk
dynamics of value versus growth stocks.
We argue that the positive return premium to ‘value’ firms compared to ‘growth’
firms is, at least in part, a logical confluence of two effects of corporate leverage;
namely that corporate leverage reduces the residual claim of equity on corporate
earnings, and corporate leverage increases the relative value of earnings risk in the
default option held by equity owners. Both of these effects respond to higher expected
earnings growth. 1 Higher future earnings growth ameliorates the value-reducing ef-
fect of leverage by increasing the flow of earnings to equity holders. The default
option for firms with higher corporate leverage is less sensitive to earnings risk. Ul-
1 Many studies that suggest explanations for this return premium focus on the asset value component of
growth opportunities, captured in the book-to-market ratio, but growth opportunities also generate potential
future earnings growth. The actual rate of future earnings growth is volatile, as it varies with business cycle
fluctuations and managerial decisions. Fama and French (2014) also highlight the role of corporate earnings
in the context of generating a positive return differential on low growth firms in the context of the dividend
discount model. Our work explicitly accounts for the effects of risk in future earnings growth
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timately, this is because the earnings market is incomplete; the primary way to gain
exposure to a firm’s earnings process is by investing in the firm’s equity. Our argu-
ment provides a novel insight into the economic drivers of the results of (Choi, 2013)
and related works (Ai and Kiku, 2013; Cooper, Gulen, and Schill, 2008; Garlappi
and Yan, 2011)
We explore the relationships between leverage, growth opportunities and the
price of equity using a stochastic earnings valuation model of equity. 2 This model
views the equity claim of a levered firm as an Asian-style call option on net earn-
ings. We show that firms with low growth opportunities are more sensitive to the
value-reducing effects of leverage, relative to firms with high growth opportunities,
suggesting a rational explanation for an expected return premium on low growth
firms. 3
Choi (2013) and related papers (Cooper, Gulen, and Schill, 2008; Trigeorgis
and Lambertides, 2014) finds that value firms are more sensitive to economic condi-
tions than growth firms. Our work provides additional insight into the drivers of this
differential sensitivity across value and growth firms to economic conditions. Specif-
ically, we develop and empirically test two main hypotheses. First, the expectation
of future earnings growth attenuates the effect of leverage on the price of equity. In
a levered firm, a share of accumulated earnings is distributed to debt holders, with
this share increasing in leverage. For a solvent firm with a given level of leverage,
future earnings growth produces earnings that primarily accrue to equity holders
as residual claimants. Therefore, ceteris paribus, an increase in leverage reduces the
price of equity and thus increases the expected return to equity of a firm with low
expected future earnings growth by more than that of a firm with high expected
future earnings growth. We hypothesise that the increased sensitivity of low-growth
2 Studies that explore valuation models similar to ours include Alcock, Mollee, and Wood (2011); Apabhai,
Georgikopoulos, Hasnip, Jamie, and Kim (1999); Epstein, Mayor, Scho¨nbucher, Whalley, and Wilmott (1998)
and Li (2003).
3 Our model is general but can be extended to demonstrate that small firms attract a return premium
relative to large firms.
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firms to the effects of leverage on the price of equity commands an expected return
premium relative to high-growth firms.
Our second hypothesis is that the expectation of future earnings growth affects
the sensitivity of the price of equity to the volatility of future earnings growth. The
price of equity of low-growth firms is more sensitive to future earnings growth volatil-
ity than that of high-growth firms, as the potential of future earnings growth implied
in a volatile earnings growth process is more valuable in a low-growth firm, whose
price of equity is more sensitive to the effects of leverage. We hypothesise that this
differential sensitivity increases the price of equity for low-growth firms compared
to the price of equity for high-growth firms, reducing relative expected returns. We
find statistically and economically significant empirical evidence to support both of
these hypotheses.
A number of studies suggest that low-growth (value) firms command a return
premium relative to high-growth (growth) firms because the former are more sensi-
tive to (macroeconomic) volatility risks (Ai and Kiku, 2013; Bansal, Dittmar, and
Kiku, 2009; Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad, 2005; Barinov, 2013; Hansen, Heaton,
and Li, 2008; Lettau and Wachter, 2007). Our findings generally concur with a dif-
ferential sensitivity to volatility risks as a driver of the return premium. However,
in terms of the direction of the impact of volatility on stock returns, our results
are more consistent with Johnson (2004) who argues that firm volatility generally
increases the value of equity. We find that the positive response in the price of eq-
uity to firm volatility is a function of the firm’s growth potential: low-growth firms
being more sensitive to the impact of earnings growth volatility than high-growth
firms. We also find that low-growth (value) firms are more sensitive to the impact
of leverage than high-growth (growth) firms. The upside-only potential implied in a
risky earnings process is more valuable in a low-growth firm, whose equity is more
sensitive to the value-reducing effects of leverage. Ceteris paribus, a levered firm
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with low growth attracts a lower price, and hence higher expected returns, than a
high-growth firm.
In addition, our findings provide insight into the channels through which volatil-
ity risks impact upon expected stock returns. The literature to date largely considers
the influence of macroeconomic, or systematic, risks (Bansal, Kiku, Shaliastovich,
and Yaron, 2012; Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron, 2007; Bansal and Yaron, 2004; Drechsler
and Yaron, 2011) and firm-specific volatility risks (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang,
2006, 2009; Avramov, Cederburg, and Hore, 2012; Bali, Cakici, Yan, and Zhang,
2005; Barinov, 2013; Barron, Stanford and Yu, 2009; Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina,
2002; Goyal and Santa-Clara, 2003; Johnson, 2004; Lehmann, 1990; Malkiel and Xu,
1997, 2002) on stock returns in isolation from each other. This separation makes it
difficult to identify the canonical effects of these two sources of uncertainty. We
empirically account for both the systematic and idiosyncratic components of risk
surrounding future earnings growth. Our approach allows us to clarify how system-
atic and idiosyncratic factors are reflected in the total volatility of the firm’s earnings
process as a central driver of value.
Furthermore, we trace how the effects of systematic and idiosyncratic volatility
filter through to expected stock returns for low- and high-growth firms. We find
that both systematic and idiosyncratic future earnings growth volatility increase
the price of equity for a levered firm. Moreover, we find that low-growth firms are
significantly more sensitive to both types of volatility than high-growth firms. Our
evidence suggests that the positive contribution of volatility to the price of equity
for low-growth firms is primarily driven by idiosyncratic volatility, while the higher
sensitivity of low-growth firms to systematic volatility increases expected returns
relative to high-growth firms, again on balance producing a positive return premium
for low-growth firms.
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2 Hypothesis development
Consider a firm that generates net earnings, Et, continuously through time
that grow at a constant rate g¯. These earnings can be modelled using the ordinary
differential equation
dEt = g¯Etdt. (1)
Risky earnings growth will also incorporate a noise component. If these noisy shocks
are independently normally distributed, then g¯t = g+σΨt, where Ψt is a white noise
process. The differential equation for earnings is then given by:
dEt = gEtdt+ σEtdWt, (2)
where Wt is a standard Wiener process.
4 The earnings of a firm with finite life T
are continuously deposited into a risk-free bank account whose current balance, At,
is given by:
At =
∫ t
0
erf (t−s)Esds. (3)
The earnings of the firm are generated by assets purchased at time 0 with the
proceeds of a single debt-issuance. These assets are assumed to be fully depreciated
over the life of the firm, so that the residual value of these assets at time T is zero.
For simplicity, we assume that this debt is a T -year zero-coupon bond, issued at par
(D).
Building on the contingent claims approach (Black and Scholes, 1972), equity
is modelled as a call option on the balance of this bank account. As the balance of
this bank account is the integral of the firm’s earnings, equity is an Asian-style call
4 The realised earnings of most firms cannot be guaranteed to be a strictly positive process. Valuing
firms with periods of negative earnings in any of the current valuation frameworks requires some restrictive
assumptions be placed on the earnings process. For example, the DCF can value firms with negative earnings
only if the timing and expectation of any negative earnings are anticipated. For the model described above, if
the true earnings process, Et, is bounded from below by −κ then one can define E˜t = Et +κ to be a strictly
positive earnings process governed by a GBM (2). This is less stringent than requiring that the timing and
value of any negative earnings are anticipated. Rather, we only require that the minimum of any negative
earnings is anticipated.
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option on the firm’s net earnings, struck at the face value of debt. 5 The variation
in the price of equity, dP , is then given by:
dP =
∂P
∂A
dA+
∂P
∂E
dE +
∂P
∂t
dt+
1
2
∂2P
∂E2
(dE)2,
where dA = (E + rfA) dt and (dE)
2 = σ2dt. As earnings are not hedgeable, we
cannot derive the pricing equation in a risk-neutral framework, and employ a general
equilibrium setting instead. Standard equilibrium arguments give the price of equity
in terms of the partial differential equation:
∂P
∂t
+ (E + rfA)
∂P
∂A
+ gE
∂P
∂E
+
1
2
σ2E2
∂2P
∂E2
− (rf + λ)P = 0, (4)
where λ represents the market price of earnings risk. Importantly, the pricing equa-
tion (4) contains the drift parameter g. This is a direct consequence of the market for
earnings being incomplete. In contrast to many contingent claim models of equity,
expected future earnings growth does impact on the price of equity, and affects the
sensitivity of equity value to leverage and earnings risk.
In the presence of debt, D, the boundary conditions are:
P (E,A, T ) = max(A−D, 0), (5)
lim
E→∞
∂2P
∂E2
= 0, (6)
∂P
∂t
+ rfA
∂P
∂A
− rfP = 0, on E = 0, (7)
lim
A→∞
P (E,A, t) ≈ A−D. (8)
where (6) and (8) limit the asymptotic growth of P with respect to E and A.
This model captures several well-known characteristics of capital management.
5 Key papers on the pricing of Asian-style options include Henderson and Wojakowski (2002); Nielsen and
Sandmann (2003); Rogers and Shi (1995).
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First, for a given level of earnings the level of leverage determines the share of earn-
ings that is distributed to debt holders and thus transferred away from equity holders
as residual claimants. This share increases in leverage. Therefore, the immediate ef-
fect of increasing leverage is to reduce the price of equity as a residual claim on
earnings. 6 Second, leverage increases the value (to equity holders) of the volatility
in future earnings growth. Leverage introduces default risk, and the option to default
limits the downside of equity as a call on accumulated earnings. From the perspec-
tive of equity holders, the potential of future earnings growth embedded in a volatile
earnings growth process becomes upside-only. For a given level of leverage, volatility
offers the possibility of positive future earnings growth that accrues primarily to
equity holders, even when expected future earnings growth is low. Uncertainty in
the earnings growth process increases the price of equity.
The general equilibrium model in Equation (4) also captures the implications
of an incomplete market for earnings. The traditional contingent claims approach
(Black and Scholes, 1972) prices equity as a call option on the firm’s assets, valued
by reference to a replicating portfolio that perfectly hedges the risks of exposure to
the firm’s equity through constructing an exactly offsetting position directly in the
underlying assets. The model prices equity as a call option on the firm’s earnings.
However, the primary way to gain exposure to the firm’s earnings is through investing
in the firm’s equity. The possibility to hedge the risks of exposure to the firm’s
earnings through alternative securities other than the firm’s equity is limited. This
limitation to constructing an exactly offsetting position in the underlying has two
major implications. The market price of earnings risk, captured in the parameter λ,
enters the model in addition to the risk-free rate, as investors require compensation
for earnings risk in addition to the risk-free rate. On the other hand, expected future
earnings growth has a significant impact on the price of equity, as the parameter g
6 Our argument does not imply that firms should not use leverage. Firms may use leverage and employ
the borrowed funds to invest in assets in the expectation that the return on equity increases so long as the
marginal return on these assets exceeds the marginal cost of debt. Rather, we study the marginal effect of
leverage on an all else equal basis.
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cannot be eliminated from the pricing formula. As a result, the model generates a set
of implications for the interrelationships between expected future earnings growth,
leverage, the volatility of future earnings growth, and the price of equity.
We illustrate these interrelationships between expected future earnings growth,
leverage, the volatility of future earnings growth, and the price of equity using nu-
merical solutions to the stochastic earnings valuation model (4). Figure 1(a) shows
that the the price of equity decreases in leverage. Increasing levels of leverage in-
creasingly transfer the benefits of earnings from equity holders, as residual claimants,
to debt holders. Figure 1(b) shows that positive earnings growth mitigates the ef-
fect of leverage on the price of equity, as earnings growth generates future earnings
benefits that accrue primarily to equity holders. In addition, this figure illustrates
that future earnings growth volatility helps counteract the effect of leverage on the
price of equity. The bounded downside of equity as a call option on the value of
the firm’s earnings, which drives the upside potential embedded in uncertain fu-
ture earnings growth, supports the price of equity in the presence of debt. Earnings
growth volatility therefore complements expected earnings growth in that it provides
a potential value gain that primarily benefits equity holders as residual claimants
on the earnings of the firm for a given level of leverage.
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 2(a) illustrates the differences in the sensitivity of the price for equity
of high and low earnings growth firms to leverage (presented as the ratio of prices
of equity for high growth firms to prices of equity for low growth firms). For low
leverage, the ratio of the price of equity of a high volatility firm to the price of
equity of a low volatility firm is low and largely insensitive to the rate of earnings
growth. The shielding effects of expected earnings growth and the potential for
earnings growth implied in a volatile earnings process add little value for equity
holders. Consequently, the prices of equity for high and low growth and volatility
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firms converge. However, when leverage is high, then the ratio between the price
of equity for a high volatility firm and a low volatility firm is significantly higher,
especially when earnings growth is low. This observation suggests that for high levels
of leverage, earnings growth volatility becomes increasingly more valuable for equity
holders - particularly as earnings growth itself decreases - increasing the relative price
of equity of a high volatility firm as compared to a low volatility firm. Furthermore,
the price ratio decreases in earnings growth, consistent with the observation that
earnings growth and earnings growth volatility are complements in the mitigation
of the effect of leverage on the price of equity. These relationships imply that the
price of equity of a low growth firm is more sensitive to changes in leverage than
that of a high growth firm.
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 2(b) shows a complementary perspective on the relative value of earnings
growth volatility by comparing the price of equity for high and low leverage firms.
When earnings growth volatility is high, then the ratio of the prices of equity for
low and high leverage firms is low. High earnings growth volatility mitigates the
reduction in the value of the residual equity claim arising from the obligation to share
the benefits of earnings with debt holders, reducing the incremental compensation
required by equity holders for sharing the benefits of earnings with debt holders.
Further, the price ratio is slightly decreasing in earnings growth, reflecting that
earnings growth and volatility are complements in mitigating the effect of leverage
on the price of equity. These observations suggest that earnings growth volatility is
more valuable in a value firm, whose equity, as a residual claim, is more exposed to
the detrimental effects of leverage, than in a growth firm, whose price of equity is
shielded from these effects by positive expected earnings growth.
The model in Equation (4) gives rise to two empirically testable hypotheses.
First, the increased exposure of low-growth firms to the effects of leverage requires
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incremental compensation in terms of higher expected returns for firms with low
expected future earnings growth relative to firms with high expected future earnings
growth.
H1: Expected stock returns for low-growth firms are more positively related to
leverage than for high-growth firms.
Second, earnings growth volatility represents upside-only potential for earnings
growth that primarily accrues to equity holders, which increases the price of equity
for a levered firm, thus reducing expected stock returns. Low-growth firms are rel-
atively more sensitive to the effects of earnings growth volatility than high-growth
firms, reducing relative expected returns. Therefore, we expect that an interaction
term between an indicator for low-growth firms and future earnings growth volatility
is significant in determining expected stock returns, and carries a negative sign.
H2: Expected stock returns for low-growth firms are more negatively related to
future earnings growth volatility than for high-growth firms.
However, leverage has a first-order negative effect on the price of equity, while
earnings growth volatility, as a higher-order term in the earnings process that governs
the value function, has a second-order positive effect on the price of equity. Therefore,
we expect that the higher sensitivity of low-growth firms to the effects of leverage
(positive impact on expected stock returns) dominates the higher sensitivity of low-
growth firms to future earnings growth volatility (negative impact on expected stock
returns). On balance therefore, in economic terms, we anticipate a net positive return
premium on low-growth firms relative to high-growth firms.
11
Summary of hypotheses
Price of Equity Expected Returns [Pt+1 − Pt]/Pt for
(Pt) All Firms Low Earnings Growth Firms
Higher Leverage Lower Higher Higher (H1)
Higher Earnings Growth Volatility Higher Lower Lower (H2)
The longer the term-to-maturity of the debt of a growing firm, the less likely
the firm is to default on a zero-coupon bond. Nevertheless, the main insights and
hypotheses are not dependent upon the term-to-maturity of the firms debt. The
same value drivers act in the similar way with longer term debt, although with
decreasing effect. As we illustrate in Figure 3, we expect our hypotheses to hold for
firms with different debt maturities; that is, our hypotheses are not dependent upon
firms having any particular finite debt maturity.
[Insert Figure 3 about here.]
Several authors provide evidence that smaller firms exhibit significantly greater
earnings risk than larger firms (Ciftci and Cready, 2011; Kothari, Laguerre, and
Leone, 2002). That is, size is inversely proportional to earnings growth volatility.
We can further extend our model by incorporating this empirical characteristic. To
do this, we substitute 1/ log(size) for σt in (4). Doing this generates a similar set
of hypotheses as H1 and H2, except for small firms rather than low growth firms.
That is, adapting our model in this manner generates a prediction that smaller firms
will attract an additional return premium relative to large firms. Similarly, a small
firm*low growth interaction term will also be significant in firm-level returns. We
empirically confirm both of these predictions in Appendix A (see Table A.1).
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3 Data and method
3.1 Data set and variable measurement
The initial sample of all NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq traded firms on Compus-
tat during 1962-2013 has 216,119 firm-year observations. After excluding financial
firms (SIC Codes 6000-6999), merging the sample with CRSP stock returns and dis-
carding observations with missing information, the final sample has 63,959 firm-year
observations.
We measure firm returns using the monthly holding period return (RET ) from
Compustat, that accounts for dividends and stock splits. We calculate annual returns
from July t to June t + 1 to allow sufficient time for accounting information to be
factored into prices (Fama and French, 1992).
We measure expected future earnings growth as the earnings-to-price ratio of
the firm. We measure total future earnings growth volatility in two different ways.
First, we measure actual future earnings growth volatility as the standard deviation
of the first difference in earnings, calculated between the end of year t and t+3. Sec-
ond, we generate a conditional expectation of total future earnings growth volatility,
using a firm-level autoregressive model. We forecast expected future earnings growth
volatility as a function of past earnings growth volatility, as follows:
Egvolit = αi + β1Egvoli,t−1 + it (9)
where Egvolit is the actual current earnings growth volatility of firm i, measured as
the standard deviation of the first difference in earnings, calculated between the end
of year t − 3 and t, and Egvoli,t−1 is the first non-overlapping lag of this variable.
This specification allows us to focus on information available when investors form
return expectations at the beginning of year t, and avoids overlapping observations
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of earnings growth volatility. We employ the predicted values from the autoregres-
sive model as a measure of expected future earnings growth volatility used to form
expectations about stock returns. For robustness, we re-estimate the autoregressive
model using a number of different lag structures (3 and 5 years).
We view total future earnings growth volatility as the sum of systematic and
idiosyncratic factors, that may arise from macroeconomic or firm-specific sources
of earnings growth risk. We aim to empirically separate the effects of these two
distinct sources of earnings growth risk. To do so, we employ a set of firm-by-firm
projections of total future earnings growth volatility on measures of macroeconomic
and firm-specific earnings growth volatility. First, we project each firm’s time se-
ries of total future earnings growth volatility on a commonly employed measure
of macroeconomic volatility, the volatility of industrial production growth (Bansal,
Kiku, Shaliastovich, and Yaron, 2012), as follows:
Egvolit = αi + β1MacroV olt + it (10)
where Egvolit is the actual current earnings growth volatility of firm i, measured
as the standard deviation of the first difference in earnings, calculated between the
end of year t− 3 and t, and MacroV ol is the the volatility of industrial production
growth, measured as the standard deviation of the growth in industrial production,
calculated between the end of year t − 3 and t. Here, for practical purposes, we
assume the availability of suitable macroeconomic forecasts. Then, we employ the
predicted values from these projections as our measure of systematic future earnings
growth volatility, that is induced by volatility in the macroeconomy. To obtain a
measure of idiosyncratic earnings growth volatility, we collect the residuals from
these projections.
Alternatively, we employ the dispersion of analyst forecasts of earnings one year
ahead as a proxy of future idiosyncratic earnings growth volatility (Diether, Malloy,
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and Scherbina, 2002; Johnson, 2004). Here, we use earnings per share estimates,
rather than the growth in these estimates, as subtracting all estimates from the
current observation of realised earnings does not affect volatility (measured as the
standard deviation). We calculate future idiosyncratic earnings growth volatility
from annual forecast dispersion data measured as the standard deviation of monthly
or quarterly, depending on availability, earnings forecasts and employ the mean
estimate across analysts. This approach preserves the observations on firms with
thin analyst coverage (one analyst).
3.2 Empirical method
We estimate the following pooled OLS regression of expected stock returns.
Superscript +/− denote the expected sign of the coefficient as per our hypotheses.
Ri,t+1 = αi + β1Levit + β2EPit +
H1: +︷ ︸︸ ︷
β3Lev25it +β4Egvolit +
H2: -︷ ︸︸ ︷
β5Egvol25it
+ β6ABETAit + β7BMit + β8Capit + β9NOAit + β10Accit + β11Issit
+ β12AGit + β13LAGit + β14MVit + β15BH6it + β16BH36it + it (11)
where Rit is the annual return on firm i measured from July t to June t + 1. We
lag all independent variables by one year in order to reflect only information that is
available when investors form expectations about stock returns for year t. Standard
errors are clustered by firm (Petersen, 2009; Thompson, 2011).
Prior literature suggests a positive sign on β1 measuring the impact of lever-
age Levit (Bhandari, 1988), defined as market leverage as in Titman, Wei, and
Xie (2004). The variable EPit is the earnings-to-price ratio (Basu, 1983; Fama and
French, 1992), which we employ as a measure of expected future earnings growth,
anticipating a positive sign on β2. Coefficient β3 measures the influence of an in-
teraction term between leverage and a dummy variable for firms with low expected
future earnings growth, Lev25it. These firms are defined as having earnings-to-price
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ratios in the top 25% in their respective 2-digit SIC group in year t. Hypothesis
1 suggests a positive sign on this coefficient, reflecting the increased sensitivity to
leverage of low-growth firms relative to high-growth firms. Coefficient β4 captures
the impact of future earnings growth volatility Egvolit. Consistent with the contin-
gent claims framework, we anticipate a negative sign on β4, reflecting the positive
effect of volatility on the price of equity, which reduces expected stock returns. Hy-
pothesis 2 suggests that the coefficient β5 on the interaction between Egvol and the
low-growth firm dummy, Egvol25it, should be significant and carry a negative sign,
reflecting the increased sensitivity to future earnings growth volatility of low-growth
firms relative to high-growth firms.
We control for a set of potentially value-relevant firm characteristics, largely
following Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008): ABETAit is the firm’s asset beta (de-
levered equity beta), where the equity beta is estimated by regressing each individual
firm’s monthly excess returns on the monthly risk premium of the market over five
years prior to the observation year. BMit is the book-to-market ratio (Rosenberg,
Reid, and Lanstein, 1985; Stattman, 1980). Capit is capital expenditure and invest-
ment (Titman, Wei, and Xie, 2004). NOAit is the ratio of net operating assets to
total assets (Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang, 2004). Further, Accit is accruals
(Sloan, 1996). Issit is issuance (Pontiff and Woodgate, 2008). AGit and LAGit are
the (lagged) values of asset growth (Cooper, Gulen, and Schill, 2008). MVit is firm
size (Banz, 1981; Keim, 1983). BH6it and BH36it are the 6- and 36-month buy and
hold returns (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993).
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports the sample firm characteristics over the study period 1962 to
2013. Over this period, the average annual total return on the stocks in the sam-
ple was 6%. Mean leverage has a mean 21%, consistent with the industrial capital
structure literature (20% to 28% market leverage on average). The mean earnings
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to price ratio is 2%, while the median is 6%, reflecting the influence of sample years
with significantly negative earnings. The book-to-market ratio is 1.23 on average.
Earnings growth volatility averaged 111% over the sample period, with a wide dis-
persion around this mean, suggesting significant variation in earnings risk across
the sample firms over the study period. The asset beta (de-levered equity beta) of
the sample firms averaged 0.93 over the study period, suggesting an almost directly
proportional relationship with the wider stock market.
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
Table 2 reports the sample firm characteristics over the study period 1962
to 2013 sorted into earnings-to-price ratio deciles. The table suggests that firms
with a high earnings-to-price ratio also tend to have high book-to-market ratios.
This observations suggests that these two measures reflect complementary aspects
of growth expectations. The book-to-market ratio focuses on the growth potential
in the value of assets. Conversely, the earnings-to-price ratio focuses on the income
growth potential implied the firm’s growth opportunities. Further, the table suggests
that low-growth firms have significantly lower future earnings growth volatility. This
observation suggests that low-growth firms are significantly more stabilised than
firms with larger growth potential. The table also suggests that there is no significant
difference in the levels of leverage in low- and high-growth firms. We argue that the
price of equity of low-growth firms is more sensitive to the distributional effects of
leverage, theoretically suggesting that low-growth firms should carry lower leverage.
However, Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) argue that leverage has a positive impact
on firm value in low-growth firms because it disciplines managers to refrain from
dispensing cash flow into wasteful investment projects, theoretically suggesting that
low-growth firms should carry higher leverage. On balance, these two factors may
cancel out in the data. The combined influence of these two factors may thus explain
the lack of significance of the leverage spread across low-and high-growth firms.
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[Insert Table 2 about here.]
Table 3 reports the pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients between the pre-
dictors. The table shows a numerically small level of correlation between the book-
to-market ratio and the earnings-to-price ratio. However, there are a number of large
values for the book-to-market ratio even after winsorising at 1st and 99th percentiles.
When we restrict to book-to-market ratio to less than 2, then the correlation be-
tween book-to-market ratio and earnings-to-price ratio increases to 15% (significant
at the 10% level), suggesting that both statistics measure aspects of growth oppor-
tunities for the firm. More generally, the table shows low levels of correlation among
the predictors, reducing concerns about multicollinearity.
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
4 Results
4.1 Total future earnings growth volatility and expected stock returns
Table 4 presents the main regression results. Our empirical findings are con-
sistent with prior theoretical and empirical work on the positive relationships be-
tween leverage and expected stock returns, as well as the earnings-to-price ratio
and expected stock returns, respectively (Basu, 1983; Bhandari, 1988). In addition
however, consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find that leverage and expected future
earnings growth significantly interact to increase expected stock returns.
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
Our finding has three main implications. First, prior research on the impact of
leverage and the earnings-to-price ratio on stock returns generally considers the ef-
fects of these firm characteristics in isolation from each other. However, we find that,
in addition to their individual marginal effects, these characteristics reinforce each
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other in determining expected stock returns. Higher leverage implies that a larger
share of a given level of accumulated earnings is distributed to debt holders, rather
than to equity holders as residual claimants. A higher earnings-to-price ratio sug-
gests lower expected future earnings growth. Our finding suggests that the positive
impact of leverage on stock returns is significantly larger for low-growth firms than
for high-growth firms. Our finding is consistent with the rationale that equity holders
of low-growth firms require compensation for the increased exposure of their equity
claim to the distributional effects of leverage. For a given level of leverage, higher
expected future earnings growth produces earnings that primarily accrue to equity
holders as residual claimants. Firms with high expected future earnings growth are
thus less sensitive to the effect of leverage on the price of the residual equity claim.
Second, prior research on the effect of leverage on stock returns as a func-
tion of growth opportunities often focuses on the asset value component of these
growth opportunities, measured as the book-to-market ratio (Jung, Kim, and Stulz,
1996; McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Stulz, 1990). We find that the effect of leverage
on stock returns is a function of the earnings component of growth opportunities,
measured as the earnings-to-price ratio. Further, prior research finds that leverage
increases firm value for firms with low growth opportunities as it disciplines man-
agers, but decreases firm value for firms with high growth opportunities as it inhibits
the pursuit of positive NPV projects. Our result suggests that the differential impact
of leverage on low- versus high-growth firms is driven by the distributional effects of
leverage, which are mitigated by higher future earnings growth.
Third, the book-to-market ratio remains significant in our regression including
the earnings-to-price ratio and the interaction between leverage and the earnings
growth indicator. This finding is consistent with our argument that the earnings-to-
price ratio and the book-to-market ratio capture two complementary components
of a firm’s growth opportunities, income and asset growth. As a result, our find-
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ing allows us to propose a rational explanation for a positive return premium on
value firms (low-growth firms with a high earnings-to-price ratio) relative to growth
firms (high-growth firms with a low earnings-to-price ratio). Specifically, our find-
ing suggests that this return premium reflects the marginal compensation required
by equity holders of low-growth firms for the increased exposure of their residual
equity claim to the distributional effects of leverage, as debt and equity holders
share the benefits of a given amount of accumulated earnings, with a larger share of
these earnings accruing to debt holders as leverage increases. Higher future earnings
growth attenuates the distributional effects of leverage, reducing expected returns
on high-growth firms relative to low-growth firms.
Many researchers have suggested explanations for the return premium com-
monly delivered by value firms over growth firms. Vassalou (2003) and Aretz, Bar-
tram, and Pope (2010) relate this premium to a set of macroeconomic variables that
proxy for shifts in the investment opportunity set. 7 Fama and French (1996) and
Garcia-Feijoo and Jorgensen (2010) suggest that this return premium reflects com-
pensation for systematic risks beyond the market factor, such as default risk or op-
erating leverage. Penman and Reggiani (2011) and Penman, Reggiani, Richardson,
and Tuna (2011) argue that the return premium on value firms results from cur-
rent accounting practice for accommodating earnings risk. In contrast, Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) and Daniel and Titman (1997) suggest behavioural ex-
planations, arguing that this return premium reflects mispricing based on cognitive
biases among investors. 8 Our findings suggest an alternative rational explanation
for the return premium on low-growth (value) firms. Our explanation is ultimately
driven by the difficulty to fully hedge earnings risk. Expected future earnings growth,
which we employ to distinguish value firms from growth firms according to the in-
7 Other studies in this macroeconomic context include Ghargori, Chan, and Faff (2007); Hahn and Lee
(2006); Kelly (2004); Liew and Vassalou (2000); Petkova (2006).
8 Studies in a similar vein also include Hall and Tochterman (2008); Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995);
Lo and MacKinlay (1990); Shumway and Warther (1999).
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come component of growth opportunities, is a significant determinant of the price of
equity because there is an incomplete market for earnings. The difficulty to construct
a replicating portfolio for earnings then also drives the significance of the interaction
between the earnings growth indicator and leverage, generating the positive return
differential between low- and high-growth firms.
The relative difference in the impact of leverage on the expected stock returns
from low- and high-growth firms is also economically significant. A one standard
deviation increase in leverage (0.22) results in a 2.73% increase in expected annual
returns for high-growth firms and a significantly higher 4.15% increase for low-growth
firms.
Consistent with the contingent claims framework, we find that future earnings
growth volatility is inversely related to expected stock returns. Our finding suggests
that total future earnings growth volatility, rather than its systematic component
only, has a significant impact on expected stock returns. Our finding supports the
argument proposed in Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) that total risk matters to in-
vestors. Further, our finding suggests that total risk surrounding expected future
earnings growth reduces expected stock returns. Our finding resonates the argu-
ment presented in Johnson (2004) that volatility makes a positive contribution to
the value of equity in a contingent claims framework. However, Johnson (2004) finds
that it is idiosyncratic volatility that makes this positive contribution. We explore the
relative impact of systematic versus idiosyncratic future earnings growth volatility
in Section 4.2. Our finding here is consistent with our argument that total earnings
growth volatility generates the potential of positive future earnings growth, even
when expected future growth is low. For a given level of leverage, this growth poten-
tial primarily benefits equity holders as residual claimants. For equity holders, this
potential is upside-only, as the pay-off from the equity claim as a call on earnings is
bounded from below, generating the positive contribution of total volatility to the
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price of equity.
In line with Hypothesis 2, we find that the interaction between future earnings
growth volatility and the indicator for low-growth firms is inversely related to ex-
pected stock returns. Our finding suggests that the upside-only potential of future
earnings growth implied in a volatile earnings growth process is more valuable in a
firm low expected future earnings growth. Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) argue that
total risk matters in the case of limited diversification induced by market frictions or
the impact of private information or habit on investment choices. Our result suggests
that total risk surrounding future earnings growth matters, and especially that it
affects low- and high-growth firms differently, not due to frictions or investor biases,
but because there is an incomplete market for earnings. Analogous to the interaction
of expected future earnings growth and leverage, the difficulty to replicate earnings
drives the significance of the interaction between expected future earnings growth
and future earnings growth volatility in determining the price of equity.
Again, the relative difference in the impact of future earnings growth volatility
on the expected stock returns from low- and high-growth firms is economically sig-
nificant. A one standard deviation increase in total earnings growth volatility (2.74)
results in a 2.90% reduction in expected annual returns for high-growth firms. For
low-growth firms, the negative effect is significantly stronger with a reduction of
4.90%. On balance however, the increased sensitivity of low-growth firms to the im-
pact of leverage (positive impact on expected stock returns) outweighs the increased
sensitivity of low-growth firms to the impact of future earnings growth volatility as
a higher-order term in the value-generating process (negative impact on expected
stock returns). As a result, even in the presence of future earnings growth volatility,
our findings suggest a net positive return premium on firms with low expected future
earnings growth (value firms).
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Our findings on the link between total future earnings growth volatility and
stock returns only have practical relevance for investors if firms with high and low
earnings growth volatility can be identified ex ante. The earnings-to-price ratio al-
ready reflects investor expectations of future growth. In order to capture expecta-
tions of future earnings growth volatility, we employ the conditional expectation of
total future earnings growth volatility from an autoregressive model as a proxy in
our regression. The construction of this proxy only requires information available to
investors when they form expectations about stock returns.
Columns 2 to 4 of Table 4 show that the evidence for the link between total
future earnings growth volatility and stock returns is robust to using this proxy,
across a range of alternative lag structures. Our finding implies a significant degree
of persistence in earnings growth volatility. The observation of persistence in earnings
and the significant information content of past earnings volatility is consistent with
Frankel and Litov (2009) and Dichev and Tang (2009, 2008). Our findings suggest
that information about past earnings growth volatility may be useful for guiding
future capital allocation and investment decisions.
In these regressions, the coefficient on the book-to-market ratio, as the tradi-
tional measure of the asset value component of growth opportunities, is significant
again. Our finding suggests that the autoregressive model generating the conditional
expectation of future earnings growth volatility, which acts as a proxy for the un-
certainty surrounding the income component of growth opportunities, contains an
estimation error. Our finding thus implicitly suggests that the book-to-market ratio
captures not only expectations about future growth opportunities as they relate to
anticipated growth in the value of assets, but also indirectly reflects some of the
uncertainty surrounding these growth opportunities.
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4.2 Decomposing future earnings growth volatility
The total volatility of a firm’s earnings growth process arguably comprises el-
ements of macroeconomic (systematic) and firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risks. These
elements may reflect the effects of factors such as fluctuations in the business cy-
cle or the uncertainty surrounding the outcomes of managerial decisions. Next, we
explore the canonical influence of the systematic and idiosyncratic components of
future earnings growth volatility and examine how these distinct sources of future
earnings growth risk influence the expected stock returns of low- and high-growth
firms, as per Hypotheses 2 and 3. Table 5 presents the results.
[Insert Table 5 about here.]
Column 1 of Table 5 considers systematic earnings growth volatility as induced
by macroeconomic volatility, and idiosyncratic earnings growth volatility as the
residual element of total earnings growth volatility that is unexplained by macroe-
conomic volatility. We find that systematic earnings growth volatility reduces ex-
pected stock returns, reflecting the upside-only potential of earnings growth implied
in a volatile earnings process. However, we find that after controlling for systematic
earnings growth volatility, the main effect of the residual idiosyncratic component
of earnings growth volatility is insignificant.
Our findings have several implications. First, prior research on the relationship
between volatility and stock returns often implicitly assumes aggregate volatility
to be constant (Campbell, 1996). However, our results suggest that variation in
the macroeconomic component of future earnings growth volatility has a significant
impact on expected stock returns. Second, some studies that explore the impact
of variation in macroeconomic volatility on stock returns adopt an approach of di-
rectly relating a measure of macroeconomic volatility to stock returns (Bansal, Kiku,
Shaliastovich, and Yaron, 2012; Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron, 2007; Bansal and Yaron,
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2004; Drechsler and Yaron, 2011). This approach makes it difficult to identify the
channels through which macroeconomic volatility is transmitted to stock returns.
Our approach allows us to trace the impact of macroeconomic volatility on expected
stock returns through its influence on the volatility of the firm’s earnings growth
process, which is a fundamental driver of the price of equity in our modelling frame-
work. At the same time, our findings suggest that the impact of macroeconomic
volatility on the firm’s earnings growth process dominates the influence of the resid-
ual idiosyncratic components of earnings growth volatility in the determination of
expected stock returns. Third, the aforementioned studies generally find a positive
relationship between macroeconomic volatility risks and stock returns. Our results
suggest that macroeconomic volatility, to the extent it is reflected in the volatility
of the firm’s earnings growth process, reduces expected stock returns. However, our
finding does not directly contradict prior evidence because we do not rule out that
the effects of macroeconomic volatility on other components of the firm’s underlying
value-generating processes may increase expected stock returns.
Consistent with the basic premise of Hypothesis 2, we find that low-growth firms
are more sensitive to both types of future earnings growth volatility. More specifically
however, we find that the increased exposure of low-growth firms to macroeconomic
volatility increases expected stock returns relative to high-growth firms. Our finding
is consistent with studies suggesting that low-growth (value) firms command a re-
turn premium relative to high-growth (growth) firms because these stocks are more
sensitive to macroeconomic volatility risks (Ai and Kiku, 2013; Bansal, Dittmar, and
Kiku, 2009; Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad, 2005; Barinov, 2013; Hansen, Heaton,
and Li, 2008; Lettau and Wachter, 2007). This return premium is commonly at-
tributed to the variation in cash flow sensitivity to macroeconomic risks along the
expected growth dimension. Our results suggest that the reason why the sensitiv-
ity of firm cash flows to macroeconomic risks decreases in expected growth is the
increased sensitivity of low- and high-growth firms to the distributional effects of
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leverage. This increased sensitivity is a significant characteristic of low-growth firms,
which we identify using the earnings-to-price ratio indicator. The positive sign of the
coefficient on the interaction between systematic future earnings growth volatility
and the low-growth firm indicator suggests that the increased sensitivity of low-
growth firms to the distributional effects of leverage (positive impact on expected
stock returns) economically outweighs the increased sensitivity of these firms to the
influence of future earnings growth volatility (negative impact on expected stock
returns) as a higher-order term in the firm’s value-generating process.
Further, consistent with Hypothesis 2, we find that the increased exposure of
low-growth firms to the residual idiosyncratic component of future earnings growth
volatility reduces expected stock returns. Our finding resonates the argument pro-
posed in Avramov, Cederburg, and Hore (2012) that low relative share firms, which
display low cash flow duration (low-growth firms), are more susceptible to firm-
specific dividend shocks. 9 However, our result implicitly suggests that the increased
sensitivity to dividend shocks may partly be related to increased sensitivity to id-
iosyncratic risks in the firm’s earnings growth process, which determines the cash
flow available for distribution to shareholders as dividends.
Column 2 of Table 5 also considers systematic earnings growth volatility as
induced by macroeconomic volatility, but idiosyncratic earnings growth volatility
is proxied by the dispersion of analyst forecasts of future earnings. The empirical
evidence continues to support our earlier finding for this alternative measure of
idiosyncratic future earnings growth volatility. Our finding concurs with the inverse
relationship between stock returns and analyst forecast dispersion reported in a
number of recent studies (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang, 2006, 2009; Diether,
Malloy, and Scherbina, 2002; Lehmann, 1990; Malkiel and Xu, 1997, 2002). Our
9 The cash flow duration of a firm is positively related to its expected dividend growth, summarised by
the relative share measure, defined as the long-run expected dividend share of a firm as a proportion of
its current dividend share, with dividend share being the fraction of the dividend paid by the firm relative
to the aggregate dividend (Menzly, Santos, and Veronesi, 2004). Similar duration-based studies include for
instance Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2005); Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2008); Lettau and Wachter (2007).
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results also concur with the options-based explanation for this empirical observation
suggested in Johnson (2004). However, we find that analyst forecast dispersion as
an alternative measure subsumes the previously significant influence of systematic
volatility and the interaction between the expected future earnings growth indicator
and the volatility measures. Our result suggests that earnings forecast dispersion is
a strong catch-all variable that jointly reflects a variety of risk factors influencing the
firm’s future earnings growth. While this characteristic renders forecast dispersion
a statistically powerful measure, our results suggest that the breadth of risk factors
captured by this measure may conceal some of the more subtle interactions between
different sources of risk impacting upon the firm’s earnings growth process, the firm’s
expected future earnings growth and its expected stock returns.
In all of our regressions, we account for a broad set of control variables that
have been found to be significantly related to stock returns. These variables include
the firm’s asset beta (de-levered equity beta), its market value, lagged buy-and-hold
returns (over 6 and 36 months) and additional determinants that may be related to
growth rates, such as accruals and capital investment. Our main variables of interest
are not subsumed by the other determinants of stock returns, in fact our variables
of interest are among the most highly significant predictors.
5 Robustness tests
We have carried out a number of additional tests in order to examine the
robustness of our results. We present and discuss the main findings below.
In our main analysis, we define firms with low expected future earnings growth
as those with earnings-to-price ratios in the top 25% in their respective 2-digit SIC
group in a given year. However, while intuitively appealing, we have no stringent
rationale for favouring this particular cut-off. For robustness, we replace this cut-
off point with a range of alternatives, and replicate our analysis with low-growth
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firms defined as those in the top 33% and 50%. Table 6 presents the results. Our
conclusions are robust to these alternative definitions of low-growth firms.
[Insert Table 6 about here.]
We also incorporate a number of additional control variables into our empiri-
cal analysis to further stress-test our findings. Table 7 presents the results. In our
main analysis, we focus on the earnings-to-price ratio of the firm as a measure
of expected future earnings growth. Some studies argue in favour of the use of
cash dividend data as a proxy of the value-relevant income that investors focus on.
However, several authors argue that dividends may not be a reliable measure of
value-relevant income, and thus distort empirical inference (Ang and Bekaert, 2007;
Bansal, Khatchatrian, and Yaron, 2005; Bansal and Yaron, 2004). Our model relies
on earnings as the central driver of the price of equity, an easily observable and
reliably measurable accounting quantity (Alcock, Mollee, and Wood, 2011; Apab-
hai, Georgikopoulos, Hasnip, Jamie, and Kim, 1999; Epstein, Mayor, Scho¨nbucher,
Whalley, and Wilmott, 1998; Li, 2003). We do not attempt to model the dividend
pay-out decision. Nevertheless, for robustness, we also include the dividend yield in
an alternative estimation. Our results are robust to this additional control variable
(Column 1 in Table Table 7).
The literature suggests a positive sign on on the regression coefficient measuring
the impact of leverage (Bhandari, 1988), defined as market leverage as in Titman,
Wei, and Xie (2004). Leverage captures aspects of default risk. For robustness, we
also actively control for the default risk (using Altman’s z-score) that may be asso-
ciated with higher firm leverage. Our findings are robust to including this additional
control (Column 2 in Table 7). Our results regarding the impact of future earn-
ings growth volatility on the expected stock returns of low-and high expected future
earnings growth firms are qualitatively similar when controlling for non-linearities in
the relationships between leverage and expected stock returns (Column 3 in Table
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7). In addition, our results are also robust to controlling for industry and year fixed
effects (Columns 4 and 5 in Table 7).
Further, we have carried out a number of robustness checks on our measures of
systematic and idiosyncratic volatility employed in the findings presented in Table
5. Table 8 presents the results of these robustness checks. In our main analysis, we
have projected firm-level total future earnings growth volatility on the volatility of
industrial production growth (Bansal, Kiku, Shaliastovich, and Yaron, 2012). For
robustness, we employ the VIO version of the VIX, available from 1986 onwards, as
a proxy for macroeconomic volatility (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang, 2006). Our
results are robust to using this measure (Column 1 in Table 8).
In our main analysis, we calculate future idiosyncratic earnings growth volatility
from annual forecast dispersion data measured as the standard deviation of monthly
or quarterly, depending on availability, earnings forecasts and employ the mean
estimate across analysts. For robustness, we also employ the median estimate across
analysts. Our results are robust to this alternative measure (Column 2 in Table 8).
Furthermore, our main findings suggest that a higher earnings-to-price ratio
is associated lower expected future earnings growth. Conversely, a low earnings-
to-price ratio does not necessarily always indicate strong expected future earnings
growth. For instance, negative earnings-to-price ratios, driven by negative earnings,
primarily suggest low profitability. For robustness, we exclude observations where the
earnings-to-price ratio is negative. Lastly, for completeness, we also add an indicator
variable for low growth firms with an earnings-to-price ratio in the top 25% in their
respective 2-digit SIC group in year t, in order to better isolate the main effect of
this group from the interactions with leverage and future earnings growth volatility.
Our conclusions regarding the inverse relationship between future earnings growth
volatility and expected stock returns, as well as the increased sensitivity of low-
growth firms to the effects of future earnings growth volatility, remain unchanged.
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The results of these additional robustness checks can be made available upon request.
6 Conclusion
We employ a stochastic earnings valuation model to examine the interrelation-
ships between leverage, expected future earnings growth, future earnings growth
volatility and the price of equity. Our approach enables us to propose a rational
explanation for an expected return premium on low-growth (value) firms relative to
high-growth (growth) firms. Furthermore, we contribute to the question how sys-
tematic and idiosyncratic components of volatility risks impact upon expected stock
returns.
We derive three main implications from our model, for which we find statisti-
cally and economically significant empirical evidence. First, the price of equity for
firms with low expected future earnings growth is more sensitive to leverage than
that of firms with high expected future earnings growth. This increased sensitivity
requires compensation in the form of higher expected returns on firms with low ex-
pected future earnings growth. Second, the upside-only potential of positive future
earnings growth implied in a volatile earnings growth process increases the price of
equity, giving rise to an inverse relationship between future earnings growth volatility
and expected stock returns. Our finding in relation to the impact of future earnings
growth volatility on stock returns is robust to employing a proxy for this volatility
that utilises only information available to investors at the time of forming expec-
tations about stock returns. Third, firms with low expected future earnings growth
are more sensitive to future earnings growth volatility, as the upside potential of
positive growth implied in a volatile earnings growth process is more valuable when
expected growth is low, reducing expected returns on low-growth firms relative to
high-growth firms. Economically however, the effect of the increased exposure of
low-growth firms to the effects of leverage dominates their increased exposure to the
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effects of future earnings growth volatility, on balance again producing a positive
return premium for low-growth (value) firms.
Further, our approach enables us to present evidence how systematic and id-
iosyncratic components of future earnings growth volatility are transmitted to ex-
pected stock returns, and to differentiate their influence across low- and high-growth
firms. We find that systematic and idiosyncratic volatility in future earnings growth
increase the price of equity for a levered firm. In addition, we find that low-growth
firms are significantly more sensitive to both types of volatility than high-growth
firms. However, our evidence also suggests that the positive marginal contribution
of volatility to the price of equity for low-growth firms is primarily driven by idiosyn-
cratic volatility, while the higher sensitivity of value firms to systematic volatility
increases expected returns on low-growth firms relative to high-growth firms.
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A Returns on Small Firms
Results for firm size (inversely related to EGVOL)
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Firm returnst+1 Total EGV Total EGV
Cut-off ratios for Low Growth Dummy employed: 33% 50%
Leverage x Low Growth Dummy (+) 0.0580*** 0.0735***
(0.01) (0.01)
Market Value ($Bils) -0.0022*** -0.0034***
(0.01) (0.01)
Market Value ($Bils) x Low Growth Dummy (+) 0.0013* 0.0027***
(0.00) (0.00)
Market Leverage 0.1301*** 0.1171***
(0.01) (0.01)
Earnings-to-price Ratio 0.0331*** 0.0256**
(0.01) (0.01)
Book-to-market equity 0.0055*** 0.0055***
(0.00) (0.00)
Asset Beta 0.0265*** 0.0267***
(0.01) (0.01)
ACCRUALS -0.0272 -0.0276
(0.03) (0.03)
Capital Expenditure -0.0244 -0.0240
(0.03) (0.03)
Net Operating Assets 0.0236** 0.0232**
(0.01) (0.01)
Issuance -0.1220*** -0.1217***
(0.01) (0.01)
Asset Growth -0.0948*** -0.0944***
(0.01) (0.01)
Lag of Asset Growth -0.0259*** -0.0256***
(0.00) (0.00)
6-month BHRET -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.01) (0.01)
36-month BHRET -0.0154*** -0.0153***
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.0158* 0.0152*
(0.01) (0.01)
Observations 63,959 63,959
Table A.1
The table presents the main regression results for the sample firms estimated as a pooled OLS regression over
the period 1962-2013. All variables are defined as in Table 1. Independent variables are lagged by one year
in order to employ only information that is available when investors form expectations about returns in year
t+ 1. The regressions employ actual future earnings growth volatility, defined as the standard deviation of
the first difference in actual earnings that are measured between the end of year t and t+3. Robust standard
errors, clustered by firm, are shown in parentheses. Predicted signs for the main variables of interest are also
shown in parentheses. Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Fig. 1. The figure illustrates the relationships between the price of equity, leverage, expected earnings
growth and earnings growth volatility. Leverage is measured as the face value of debt (K) relative to initial
assets (A0). Figure 1(a) shows the price of equity as a function of leverage for ‘value’ firms (earnings growth
= 0) and ‘growth’ firms (earnings growth = 0.3). Figure 1(b) shows the price of equity as a function of
expected earnings growth for firms with high (earnings growth volatility = 0.75) and low (earnings growth
volatility = 0.05) levels of earnings growth volatility.
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volatility
Fig. 2. The figure illustrates the relationships between the relative price of equity, leverage, expected
earnings growth and earnings growth volatility. Leverage is measured as the face value of debt (K) relative
to initial assets (A0). Figure 2(a) shows the relative price of equity between high and low earnings growth
volatility firms as a function of future earnings growth for low (leverage = 3) and high (leverage = 5) leverage
firms. Figure 2(b) shows the relative price of equity between high and low leverage firms as a function of
expected earnings growth for firms with high (earnings growth volatility = 0.75) and low (earnings growth
volatility = 0.05) levels of earnings growth volatility.
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(a) The relative price of equity and leverage for debt
maturity of ten years
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(b) The relative price of equity and leverage for debt
maturity of fifteen years
Fig. 3. The figure illustrates the relationships between the relative price of equity, leverage, expected
earnings growth and earnings growth volatility for different debt maturities. Leverage is measured as the
face value of debt (K) relative to initial assets (A0). Figure 3(a) shows the relative price of equity between
high and low earnings growth volatility firms as a function of future earnings growth for low (leverage = 3)
and high (leverage = 5) leverage firms with a debt maturity of 10 years. Figure 3(b) shows the relative price
of equity between high and low earnings growth volatility firms as a function of future earnings growth for
low (leverage = 3) and high (leverage = 5) leverage firms with a debt maturity of 15 years.
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Financial and return characteristics of the sample firms over the period 1962-2013
textbfVariable Mean SD Min 25th pct Median 75th pct Max
Returns 0.06 0.44 -1.28 -0.18 0.07 0.31 1.28
Market Leverage 0.21 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.36 0.81
EP Ratio 0.02 0.23 -1.41 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.35
BM Ratio 1.23 2.71 -0.22 0.37 0.69 1.19 23.70
EGVOL 1.11 2.74 0.02 0.13 0.29 0.78 20.34
Asset Beta 0.93 0.46 0.12 0.61 0.87 1.17 2.41
Market Value ($bil) 1.22 3.64 0.002 0.034 0.147 0.681 26.735
Accruals -0.03 0.08 -0.30 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.23
Capital Investment 0.01 0.08 -0.29 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60
Net Operating Assets 0.68 0.27 -0.06 0.55 0.70 0.83 1.63
Issuance 0.10 0.23 -0.35 -0.00 0.03 0.15 1.19
Asset Growth 0.13 0.30 -0.41 -0.00 0.08 0.19 1.76
Lag of Asset Growth 0.15 0.32 -0.40 0.00 0.09 0.20 1.88
6-m BH Return 0.14 0.39 -0.57 -0.09 0.08 0.28 1.80
36-m BH Return 0.57 1.25 -0.87 -0.20 0.27 0.91 6.64
Table 1
The table presents financial and return characteristics of the sample firms over the period 1962-2013. We
measure firm returns using the monthly holding period returns (variable name RET) from Compustat,
which account for dividends and stock splits, annualised from July in year t to June in year (t + 1). The
other variables are defined as follows (with Compustat item names in parentheses). Market Leverage, as
used in Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004). It is defined as long-term debt/(long-term debt + market value of
equity) [(DLTT)/(DLTT+PRCC F*CSHO)]. The earnings-to-price ratio (EP Ratio) is [EPS (EPSPI)/ Price
(PRCC C)]. The book-to-market ratio (BM Ratio) for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t, is defined as
in Davis, Fama, and French (2000), where book equity is the stockholders’ equity (SEQ), plus balance sheet
deferred taxes and investment tax credit (TXDITC), minus book value of preferred stock (in the following
order: PSTKRV or PSTKL or PSTK) and market equity is the price times shares outstanding at the end
of December of calendar year t. We define total future earnings growth volatility (EGVOL) as the standard
deviation of the first difference in actual earnings that are measured between the end of year t and t + 3.
Asset beta is the firm’s asset beta (de-levered equity beta), where equity beta is estimated by regressing each
individual firm’s monthly excess returns on the monthly risk premium of the market over five years prior
to the observation year. Market value is the price per share (PRCC C) times shares outstanding (CSHO)
at the end of June of calendar year t. Accruals = [(change in current assets - change in cash) - (change in
current liabilities - change in short-term debt - change in taxes payable) - depreciation expense]/average
total assets): [(∆ACT - ∆CHE) - (∆LCT - ∆DLC - ∆TXP) - DP]/[(ATt + ATt-1)/2]. Capital investment
is the abnormal capital investment measure used in Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004). [CEt / (CEt−1 + CEt−2
+ CEt−3 )/3 - 1], where CEt is capital expenditures (CAPX) in fiscal year t and each capital expenditure
term is scaled by that year t net sales (SALE). Net operating assets, as in Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang
(2004), is net operating assets scaled by lagged total assets. Net operating assets is the difference between
operating assets (OA) and operating liabilities (OL), where OA = total assets (AT) - cash and short-term
investments (CHE), and OL = total assets (AT) - debt in current liabilities (DLC) - long-term debt (DLTT)
- minority interest (MIB) - preferred stock (PSTK) - common equity (CEQ). Issuance, as used in Daniel
and Titman (2006), is log[MEt/MEt-3] - r(t,t-3) where ME is total market equity = (PRCC F*CSHO) and
r(t,t-3) is the 3-year log return. Asset growth is the 1-year percentage change in total firm assets [(assetst -
assetst−1)/ assetst−1], where assets are Compustat item name (AT) as in Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008).
To compute asset growth, a firm must have nonzero total assets in both years, t-1 and t-2. The lag of asset
growth is the 1-year lagged value of asset growth. The calculation of buy-and-hold returns follows DeBondt
and Thaler (1985); Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The 6-month buy-and-hold return (6-m. BH Return) is
calculated over January (t) to June (t) [(1+r1) x ... x (1+r6) - 1] where ri is the return in month i. The
36-month buy-and-hold return (36-m. BH Return) is calculated over July (t-3) to June (t) [(1+r1) x ... x
(1+r36) - 1] where ri is the return in month i. Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.10.
40
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l
a
n
d
r
e
tu
r
n
c
h
a
r
a
c
te
r
is
ti
c
s
o
f
th
e
sa
m
p
le
fi
r
m
s
o
v
e
r
th
e
p
e
r
io
d
1
9
6
2
-2
0
1
3
b
y
e
a
r
n
in
g
s-
to
-p
r
ic
e
r
a
ti
o
d
e
c
il
e
s
D
ec
il
e
1
(L
o
w
)
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
(H
ig
h
)
S
p
re
a
d
(1
-1
0
)
t(
sp
re
a
d
)
E
P
R
a
ti
o
-0
.2
9
1
-0
.0
4
4
0
.0
1
8
0
.0
4
5
0
.0
6
2
0
.0
7
5
0
.0
8
7
0
.1
0
1
0
.1
2
1
0
.1
6
4
-0
.4
5
5
*
*
*
9
.1
8
M
a
rk
et
L
ev
er
a
g
e
0
.2
5
4
0
.0
9
7
0
.0
9
2
0
.1
0
5
0
.1
2
2
0
.1
4
9
0
.1
8
1
0
.2
2
9
0
.2
5
6
0
.2
8
5
-0
.0
3
0
6
1
.0
1
B
M
R
a
ti
o
0
.9
0
3
0
.5
3
7
0
.5
1
9
0
.5
1
7
0
.5
7
1
0
.6
4
5
0
.7
5
5
0
.8
7
4
0
.9
8
8
1
.1
1
3
-0
.2
0
9
*
2
.1
4
E
G
V
O
L
0
.7
3
7
0
.5
5
3
0
.4
6
9
0
.2
9
7
0
.2
2
7
0
.2
0
8
0
.1
9
8
0
.2
0
2
0
.2
1
8
0
.3
1
7
0
.4
2
0
*
*
*
9
.4
8
A
ss
et
B
et
a
0
.9
3
5
1
.0
5
3
1
.0
2
1
0
.9
9
0
0
.9
1
9
0
.8
7
5
0
.8
3
7
0
.7
8
1
0
.7
5
3
0
.7
3
1
0
.2
0
4
*
*
*
5
.0
7
M
a
rk
et
V
a
lu
e
($
b
il
)
0
.0
9
1
0
.1
8
1
0
.2
4
3
0
.3
0
8
0
.3
8
1
0
.3
5
0
0
.3
9
6
0
.4
0
2
0
.2
6
5
0
.1
4
5
-0
.0
5
5
1
.2
9
A
cc
ru
a
ls
-0
.0
7
2
-0
.0
3
9
-0
.0
2
3
-0
.0
2
4
-0
.0
2
9
-0
.0
2
7
-0
.0
2
7
-0
.0
3
0
-0
.0
2
7
-0
.0
2
8
-0
.0
4
4
2
*
*
*
8
.4
C
a
p
it
a
l
In
v
es
tm
en
t
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
2
2
2
*
*
*
5
.8
5
N
et
O
p
er
a
ti
n
g
A
ss
et
s
0
.5
7
7
0
.6
4
7
0
.6
9
6
0
.7
2
7
0
.7
2
6
0
.7
3
4
0
.7
3
9
0
.7
3
9
0
.7
4
3
0
.7
1
9
-0
.1
4
2
*
*
*
5
.8
8
Is
su
a
n
ce
0
.2
3
8
0
.3
5
6
0
.3
6
1
0
.4
3
2
0
.4
3
9
0
.2
6
4
0
.2
1
8
0
.1
4
6
0
.1
3
8
0
.1
2
4
0
.1
1
5
*
2
.1
6
A
ss
et
G
ro
w
th
-0
.0
7
2
0
.0
4
0
0
.0
8
8
0
.1
2
3
0
.1
0
7
0
.1
0
4
0
.0
9
4
0
.0
8
2
0
.0
8
3
0
.0
9
2
-0
.1
6
4
*
*
*
9
.1
8
L
.A
ss
et
G
ro
w
th
0
.0
3
8
0
.0
7
9
0
.1
0
1
0
.1
2
3
0
.1
1
3
0
.1
0
4
0
.0
8
9
0
.0
8
3
0
.0
8
0
0
.0
7
5
-0
.0
3
7
7
*
2
.2
7
6
-m
B
H
R
et
u
rn
0
.1
2
7
0
.0
5
2
0
.0
4
1
0
.0
4
9
0
.0
4
8
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
7
1
0
.0
9
2
0
.1
0
1
0
.1
0
2
0
.0
2
4
8
0
.5
9
3
6
-m
B
H
R
et
u
rn
-0
.2
8
1
0
.0
8
1
0
.2
7
2
0
.3
8
5
0
.3
9
4
0
.3
9
2
0
.3
7
4
0
.3
6
9
0
.4
2
0
0
.4
5
0
-0
.7
3
1
*
*
*
7
.8
5
T
ab
le
2
:
T
h
e
ta
b
le
p
re
se
n
ts
fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l
a
n
d
re
tu
rn
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
o
f
th
e
sa
m
p
le
fi
rm
s
o
v
er
th
e
p
er
io
d
1
9
6
2
-2
0
1
3
b
y
ea
rn
in
g
s-
to
-p
ri
ce
ra
ti
o
d
ec
il
es
.
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
d
efi
n
ed
a
s
fo
ll
o
w
s
(w
it
h
C
o
m
p
u
st
a
t
it
em
n
a
m
es
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
).
M
a
rk
et
L
ev
er
a
g
e,
a
s
u
se
d
in
T
it
m
a
n
,
W
ei
,
a
n
d
X
ie
(2
0
0
4
).
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d
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ed
a
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lo
n
g
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er
m
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t/
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o
n
g
-t
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m
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+
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rk
et
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e
o
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eq
u
it
y
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(D
L
T
T
+
P
R
C
C
F
*
C
S
H
O
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.
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e
ea
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in
g
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-p
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ce
ra
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.
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b
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ra
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ca
le
n
d
a
r
y
ea
r
t,
is
d
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),
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b
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eq
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it
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e
st
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ck
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o
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er
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eq
u
it
y
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E
Q
),
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n
ce
sh
ee
t
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re
d
ta
x
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a
n
d
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v
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tm
en
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ta
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cr
ed
it
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X
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IT
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m
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u
s
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o
o
k
v
a
lu
e
o
f
p
re
fe
rr
ed
st
o
ck
(i
n
th
e
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
o
rd
er
:
P
S
T
K
R
V
o
r
P
S
T
K
L
o
r
P
S
T
K
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n
d
m
a
rk
et
eq
u
it
y
is
th
e
p
ri
ce
ti
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es
sh
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re
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o
u
ts
ta
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t
th
e
en
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o
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b
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r
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ea
r
t.
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d
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n
e
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ta
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tu
re
ea
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in
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ro
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V
O
L
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th
e
st
a
n
d
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rd
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e
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d
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b
et
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o
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.
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ss
et
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et
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th
e
fi
rm
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et
b
et
a
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v
er
ed
eq
u
it
y
b
et
a
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h
er
e
eq
u
it
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et
a
is
es
ti
m
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d
b
y
re
g
re
ss
in
g
ea
ch
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u
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l
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’s
m
o
n
th
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ex
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tu
rn
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n
th
e
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th
ly
ri
sk
p
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o
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e
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v
e
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th
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o
b
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r.
M
a
rk
et
v
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lu
e
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th
e
p
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p
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sh
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re
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R
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C
)
ti
m
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sh
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re
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o
u
ts
ta
n
d
in
g
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S
H
O
)
a
t
th
e
en
d
o
f
J
u
n
e
o
f
ca
le
n
d
a
r
y
ea
r
t.
A
cc
ru
a
ls
=
[(
ch
a
n
g
e
in
cu
rr
en
t
a
ss
et
s
-
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a
n
g
e
in
ca
sh
)
-
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h
a
n
g
e
in
cu
rr
en
t
li
a
b
il
it
ie
s
-
ch
a
n
g
e
in
sh
o
rt
-t
er
m
d
eb
t
-
ch
a
n
g
e
in
ta
x
es
p
a
y
a
b
le
)
-
d
ep
re
ci
a
ti
o
n
ex
p
en
se
]/
a
v
er
a
g
e
to
ta
l
a
ss
et
s)
:
[(
∆
A
C
T
-
∆
C
H
E
)
-
(∆
L
C
T
-
∆
D
L
C
-
∆
T
X
P
)
-
D
P
]/
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A
T
t
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A
T
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1
)/
2
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C
a
p
it
a
l
in
v
es
tm
en
t
is
th
e
a
b
n
o
rm
a
l
ca
p
it
a
l
in
v
es
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en
t
m
ea
su
re
u
se
d
in
T
it
m
a
n
,
W
ei
,
a
n
d
X
ie
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0
0
4
).
[C
E
t
/
(C
E
t−
1
+
C
E
t−
2
+
C
E
t−
3
)/
3
-
1
],
w
h
er
e
C
E
t
is
ca
p
it
a
l
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s
(C
A
P
X
)
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fi
sc
a
l
y
ea
r
t
a
n
d
ea
ch
ca
p
it
a
l
ex
p
en
d
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u
re
te
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a
le
d
b
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th
a
t
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r
t
n
et
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s
(S
A
L
E
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N
et
o
p
er
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ti
n
g
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ss
et
s,
a
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in
H
ir
sh
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er
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o
u
,
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eo
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,
a
n
d
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h
a
n
g
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et
o
p
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n
g
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d
b
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g
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p
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d
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b
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p
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et
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n
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o
p
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n
g
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a
b
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it
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h
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e
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l
a
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et
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-
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a
n
d
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o
rt
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m
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v
es
tm
en
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n
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ta
l
a
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et
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rr
en
t
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a
b
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n
g
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er
m
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t
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L
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m
in
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ri
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te
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st
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-
p
re
fe
rr
ed
st
o
ck
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S
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y
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d
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l
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M
E
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h
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e
M
E
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l
m
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rk
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u
it
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R
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S
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O
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n
d
r (
t,
t-
3
)
is
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p
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h
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p
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p
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p
u
te
a
ss
et
g
ro
w
th
,
a
fi
rm
m
u
st
h
a
v
e
n
o
n
ze
ro
to
ta
l
a
ss
et
s
in
b
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b
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n
d
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b
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+
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+
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b
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+
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h
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b
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n
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a
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w
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e
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n
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a
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o
n
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ts
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n
th
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p
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r
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n
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b
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d
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o
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a
g
e,
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u
se
d
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T
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m
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,
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ei
,
a
n
d
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ie
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0
0
4
).
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d
efi
n
ed
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n
g
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er
m
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eb
t/
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o
n
g
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er
m
d
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m
a
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v
a
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u
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y
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ra
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P
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b
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ra
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d
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b
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d
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ed
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s
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o
k
v
a
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e
o
f
p
re
fe
rr
ed
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o
ck
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n
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o
w
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g
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rd
er
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R
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r
P
S
T
K
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r
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S
T
K
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n
d
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et
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p
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b
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d
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d
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b
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e
fi
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b
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eq
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b
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p
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t.
A
cc
ru
a
ls
=
[(
ch
a
n
g
e
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e
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e
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a
b
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a
n
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e
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a
n
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e
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ta
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p
a
y
a
b
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)
-
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a
ti
o
n
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p
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∆
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b
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d
in
T
it
m
a
n
,
W
ei
,
a
n
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p
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b
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p
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Results for actual and expected total future earnings growth volatility (EGVOL)
Dependent variable: Firm returnst+1 (1) (2) (3) (4)
EGVOL measure employed: Total EGV AR(1) AR(3) AR(5)
Leverage x Low Growth Dummy (+) 0.0645*** 0.0624 0.0702 0.0726
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
EGVOL (-) -0.0106*** -0.0220*** -0.0237** -0.0247***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EGVOL x Low Growth Dummy (-) -0.0073*** 0.0038 0.0012 0.0020
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Market Leverage 0.1240*** 0.0843** 0.0670 0.0709
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Earnings-to-price Ratio 0.0239** 0.0234* 0.0415*** 0.0512***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Book-to-market equity 0.0055*** 0.0063*** 0.0069*** 0.0083***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Asset Beta 0.0305*** 0.0376*** 0.0384*** 0.0520***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ACCRUALS -0.0145 -0.0196 -0.0078 0.0049
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Capital Expenditure -0.0160 -0.0235 -0.0436 -0.0254
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08)
Net Operating Assets 0.0177* 0.0080 0.0279** 0.0160
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Issuance -0.1171*** -0.0974*** -0.0850*** -0.0748***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Asset Growth -0.0928*** -0.0843*** -0.1043*** -0.1045***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Lag of Asset Growth -0.0269*** -0.0285*** -0.0442*** -0.0482***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Market Value (Bil) -0.0024*** -0.0028*** -0.0033*** -0.0030***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
6-month BHRET -0.0009 -0.0032 -0.0149** -0.0230***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
36-month BHRET -0.0173*** -0.0177*** -0.0186*** -0.0160***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.0330*** 0.0436*** 0.0444*** 0.0352***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 63,959 53,172 43,297 34,393
Table 4
The table presents the main regression results for the sample firms estimated as a pooled OLS regression
over the period 1962-2013. All variables are defined as in Table 1. Independent variables are lagged by one
year in order to employ only information that is available when investors form expectations about returns
in year t + 1. Specification (1) employs actual future earnings growth volatility, defined as the standard
deviation of the first difference in actual earnings that are measured between the end of year t and t + 3.
Specifications (2) to (4) employ expected future future earnings growth volatility from autoregressive models
with different lag structures, using non-overlapping observations. Robust standard errors, clustered by firm,
are shown in parentheses. Predicted signs for the main variables of interest are also shown in parentheses.
Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Results for systematic and idiosyncratic future earnings growth volatility (EGVOL)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Macro Idio - Direct EPS
Dependent variable: Firm returnst+1 (1) (2)
Volatility measure employed: Macroeconomic volatility Dispersion
Systematic EGVOL (-) -0.0995*** -0.0112
(0.02) (0.04)
Systematic EGVOL x Low Growth Dummy (-) 0.0842*** -0.0034
(0.01) (0.03)
Idiosyncratic EGVOL (-) -0.0011 -0.2714***
(0.00) (0.08)
Idiosyncratic EGVOL x Low Growth Dummy (-) -0.0114** 0.0721
(0.00) (0.08)
tab:corr Market Leverage 0.1535*** 0.1349***
(0.01) (0.02)
Earnings-to-price Ratio 0.0196* -0.0329
(0.01) (0.03)
Book-to-market equity 0.0050*** 0.0235***
(0.00) (0.00)
Asset Beta 0.0313*** 0.0261***
(0.01) (0.01)
ACCRUALS -0.0155 -0.0339
(0.03) (0.05)
Capital Expenditure -0.0130 -0.2727**
(0.03) (0.12)
Net Operating Assets 0.0046 0.0347**
(0.01) (0.02)
Issuance -0.1101*** -0.0902***
(0.01) (0.02)
Asset Growth -0.0897*** -0.1004***
(0.01) (0.02)
Lag of Asset Growth -0.0295*** -0.0234*
(0.01) (0.01)
Market Value (Bil) -0.0023*** -0.0007
(0.00) (0.00)
6-month BHRET -0.0013 0.0064
(0.01) (0.01)
36-month BHRET -0.0162*** -0.0202***
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.0448** 0.0502
(0.02) (0.04)
Observations 63,959 19,422
Table 5
The table presents the additional regression results for the sample firms estimated as a pooled OLS regression
over the period 1962-2013. All variables are defined as in Table 1. Independent variables are lagged by one year
in order to employ only information that is available when investors form expectations about returns in year
t+ 1. Specification (1) employs systematic future earnings growth volatility, defined as the predicted value
from firm-level projections of total actual future earnings growth volatility on macroeconomic volatility, and
idiosyncratic future earnings growth volatility, defined as the residual from these projections. Specification
(2) employs replaces idiosyncratic future earnings growth volatility with the measure obtained from the
dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts. Robust standard errors, clustered by firm, are shown in parentheses.
Predicted signs for the main variables of interest are also shown in parentheses. Significance is indicated as
follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Results for total future earnings growth volatility (EGVOL) with different cut-off for the low
growth indicator
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Firm returnst+1 Total EGV Total EGV Total EGV
Low Growth Indicator: EP cut-off points 25% 33% 50%
Leverage x Low Growth Dummy (+) 0.0645*** 0.0730*** 0.0886***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EGVOL (-) -0.0106*** -0.0101*** -0.0086***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
EGVOL * Low Growth Dummy (-) -0.0073*** -0.0079*** -0.0095***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market Leverage 0.1240*** 0.1164*** 0.1012***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Earnings-to-price Ratio 0.0239** 0.0215* 0.0177
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Book-to-market equity 0.0055*** 0.0055*** 0.0055***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Asset Beta 0.0305*** 0.0305*** 0.0306***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ACCRUALS -0.0145 -0.0144 -0.0118
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Capital Expenditure -0.0160 -0.0159 -0.0162
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Net Operating Assets 0.0177* 0.0177* 0.0164*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Issuance -0.1171*** -0.1175*** -0.1184***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Asset Growth -0.0928*** -0.0924*** -0.0914***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lag of Asset Growth -0.0269*** -0.0266*** -0.0260***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Market Value in Bils -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0024***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
6-month BHRET -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0013
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
36-month BHRET -0.0173*** -0.0173*** -0.0172***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.0330*** 0.0330*** 0.0332***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 63,959 63,959 63,959
Table 6
The table presents the main regression results for the sample firms estimated as a pooled OLS regression over
the period 1962-2013. All variables are defined as in Table 1. Independent variables are lagged by one year
in order to employ only information that is available when investors form expectations about returns in year
t+ 1. The regressions employ actual future earnings growth volatility, defined as the standard deviation of
the first difference in actual earnings that are measured between the end of year t and t+3. Robust standard
errors, clustered by firm, are shown in parentheses. Predicted signs for the main variables of interest are also
shown in parentheses. Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Results for total future earnings growth volatility (EGVOL) with additional control variables
Dependent variable: Firm returnst+1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Additional control variables Div Yield Z-Score Leverage2 SIC2d FE SIC2d year FE
Leverage x Low Growth (+) 0.0692*** 0.0556*** 0.0640*** 0.0676*** 0.0777***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EGVOL (-) -0.0100*** -0.0112*** -0.0106*** -0.0105*** -0.0103***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
EGVOL * Low Growth Dummy (-) -0.0070*** -0.0073*** -0.0073*** -0.0071*** -0.0050***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market Leverage 0.0931*** 0.1364*** 0.1048*** 0.1248*** 0.0607***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Earnings-to-price Ratio 0.0061 0.0357*** 0.0250** 0.0187 -0.0075
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Book-to-market equity 0.0052*** 0.0050*** 0.0055*** 0.0057*** 0.0041***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Asset Beta 0.0421*** 0.0447*** 0.0305*** 0.0444*** 0.0400***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ACCRUALS -0.0229 -0.0162 -0.0158 -0.0119 -0.0648**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Capital Expenditure -0.0155 0.0317 -0.0163 -0.0188 -0.0420
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Net Operating Assets 0.0195** -0.0080 0.0191** 0.0198** 0.0230**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Issuance -0.1204*** -0.1239*** -0.1171*** -0.1258*** -0.1240***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Asset Growth -0.0847*** -0.0726*** -0.0935*** -0.0929*** -0.0801***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lag of Asset Growth -0.0218*** -0.0286*** -0.0270*** -0.0262*** -0.0160**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Market Value in Bils -0.0025*** -0.0024*** -0.0023*** -0.0028*** -0.0001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
6-month BHRET -0.0018 -0.0025 -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0068
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
36-month BHRET -0.0171*** -0.0153*** -0.0173*** -0.0180*** -0.0168***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dividend Yield 0.8278***
(0.06)
Z-score -0.0001***
(0.00)
Market Leverage2 0.0302
(0.04)
Constant 0.0076 0.0373*** 0.0335*** 0.0349 0.1390***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05)
Observations 63,864 56,451 63,959 63,959 63,959
SIC 2digit Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes
Table 7
The table presents robustness tests for the sample firms estimated as a pooled OLS regression over the period
1962-2013. Variable definitions and specification follow the main regressions. In Column (1), (2) and (3), we
control for dividend yield, Altman’s Z-score, and market leverage squared, respectively. In Columns (4) and
(5), we additionally control for industry and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by firm,
are shown in parentheses. Predicted signs for the main variables of interest are also shown in parentheses.
Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Results for systematic and idiosyncratic future earnings growth volatility with alternative
measures
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Firm returnst+1 Systematic EGVOL Median Dispersion
(from VIO) (analyst forecasts)
Systematic EGVOL (-) -1.9274*** -0.0138
(0.04) (0.04)
Systematic EGVOL x Low Growth Dummy (-) 0.0701*** -0.0015
(0.01) (0.03)
Idiosyncratic EGVOL (-) -0.0014 -0.2684***
(0.00) (0.08)
Idiosyncratic EGVOL x Low Growth Dummy (-) -0.0080* 0.0667
(0.00) (0.08)
Market Leverage 0.0929*** 0.1361***
(0.01) (0.02)
Earnings-to-price Ratio -0.0429*** -0.0329
(0.01) (0.03)
Book-to-market equity 0.0024*** 0.0235***
(0.00) (0.00)
Asset Beta 0.0190*** 0.0264***
(0.01) (0.01)
ACCRUALS -0.0811** -0.0333
(0.03) (0.05)
Capital Expenditure -0.0209 -0.2686**
(0.02) (0.12)
Net Operating Assets 0.0317*** 0.0342**
(0.01) (0.02)
Issuance -0.0997*** -0.0901***
(0.01) (0.02)
Asset Growth -0.0870*** -0.1000***
(0.01) (0.02)
Lag of Asset Growth -0.0017 -0.0232*
(0.01) (0.01)
Market Value (Bil) 0.0003 -0.0007
(0.00) (0.00)
6-month BHRET 0.0247*** 0.0065
(0.01) (0.01)
36-month BHRET -0.0252*** -0.0203***
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 2.4197*** 0.0514
(0.06) (0.04)
Observations 43,374 19,422
Table 8
The table presents robustness tests to Table 5 for the sample firms estimated as a pooled OLS regression over
the period 1962-2013. Variable definitions and specification follow the main regressions in Table 5. Column
(1) replaces the volatility of industrial production growth with VIO version of the VIX to project firm-level
total future earnings growth volatility, as a proxy for macroeconomic volatility (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and
Zhang, 2006). Column (2) employs the median estimate rather than mean estimate across analyst to proxy
for idiosyncratic earnings growth volatility. Predicted signs for the main variables of interest are also shown
in parentheses. Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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